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Abstract
We investigate the reasons of having confidence in mathematical theorems. The
formalist point of view maintains that formal derivations underlying proofs, al-
though usually not carried out in practice, contribute to this confidence. Opposing
this opinion, the main claim of the present paper is that such a gain of confidence
obtained from any link between proofs and formal derivations is, even in principle,
impossible in the present state of knowledge. Our argument is based on consider-
ations concerning length of formal derivations. We also discuss psychological and
social factors that contribute to building belief in theorems.
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1 Introduction
Most of the common mathematical practice deals with proofs of theorems. As authors,
mathematicians∗ invent proofs and try to write them down rigorously; as readers, they
try to verify and understand proofs of other mathematicians; as referees and journal
editors, they assess the interest and value of proofs, and as teachers, they explain proofs
to novices.
Why are mathematicians so concerned with proofs? Or, reformulated in a more direct
way: Why do we prove theorems? This question serves as the title of the paper by
Rav [1999]. At first, one may be tempted to give a deceptively simple answer: we prove
theorems to convince ourselves and others that they are true. While this is often, indeed,
the direct reason for proving a theorem (very often a conjecture is first stated by someone
and then the same person or some other mathematician proves it to give it a status of
a theorem, or disproves it, to give a status of a theorem to its negation), the convincing
power is far from being the unique role of proofs in the mathematical practice. Often the
new ideas and techniques conveyed by a proof are much more important than the theorem
for which the proof was originally invented. Rav [1999] (page 20) formulates it succinctly:
Proofs are for the mathematician what experimental procedures are for the
experimental scientist: in studying them one learns of new ideas, new concepts,
new strategies – devices which can be assimilated for one’s own research and
be further developed.
and illustrates this epistemic function of proofs by well chosen examples.
Nevertheless, the role of proofs as means of convincing the mathematical community
∗The term “mathematician” is used here in a large sense and encompasses all scientists adopting
the methodology of proofs taken from “mainstream” mathematics. Hence, apart from, say, algebraists
or topologists, it includes, e.g., mathematical logicians and theoretical computer scientists but excludes
users of mathematics, such as engineers or physicists, interested in mathematical results but not in the
way they are obtained. To justify this classification through a personal example, the present author,
formerly a set theorist and currently working in theoretical computer science, has not felt significant
methodological change when changing his subject of interest: the (high-level) methodology remained the
same – proving theorems then, proving theorems now, only subjects of these theorems changed, although
quite dramatically, from large cardinals to distributed algorithms.
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about the validity of theorems is very important. While proofs can also serve other
purposes, only proofs can directly serve this purpose. Since the subject of the present
study is establishing reasons for believing theorems, rather than discussing epistemic
value of proofs, our perspective on proofs is much more restrictive than that of Rav
[1999]. He dealt with the question “Why do we prove theorems?” and so was concerned
with all aspects of proofs, both as ways to convince that the proved theorem is correct,
and as repositories of mathematical knowledge. Our question (the title of this paper is
deliberately modeled on the title of Rav [1999]) is “Why do we believe theorems?”. Thus
we are only interested in the “convincing” role of proofs. However, since in many cases
a particular mathematician does not have access to a proof of a particular result, and
still has to form a belief about it, we will also consider other factors that contribute to
such beliefs. As mentioned above, only proofs can directly serve the purpose of convincing
mathematicians about the validity of theorems but, as discussed in Section 5, there are
also indirect ways to form such convictions, on which mathematicians often have to rely.
Before announcing our position concerning reasons of believing theorems, we need to
explain two crucial terms that will be used throughout the paper: proof and derivation.
In choosing these particular terms, we follow Rav [1999]. (The expressions informal
proof instead of proof and formal proof instead of derivation could be also used, as they
convey the sense we want to give to those terms, but we find Rav’s terminology more
convenient.) By proofs we will mean the arguments used in mathematical practice in
order to justify correctness of theorems. Since this simply reports the meaning adopted
by the mathematical community, there is no formal definition of this term. On the other
hand, the term derivation is used in its formal, logical sense. Recall that a formalized
language is described first. It has an appropriate alphabet (containing, among others,
logical symbols). Terms and formulae of this language are defined as specific strings of
symbols of this alphabet. Then a formalized theory T is defined in this language by
specifying a – possibly infinite – recursive set∗ of formulae called axioms that form the
basis of the theory. A finite set of transformations called inference rules is specified. These
transformations permit to obtain a new formula from a finite set of formulae. One example
∗This is a technical term whose informal meaning is that there exists a mechanical method to verify
if a given sentence is a member of the set or not.
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of an inference rule is modus ponens. Finally, a (linear) derivation is a finite sequence of
formulae such that every term of this sequence is either an axiom or is obtained from a
set of earlier terms of this sequence by applying one of the inference rules. A formula of
the above formalized language is called a theorem of the theory T , if it is the last formula
in some derivation. The crucial characteristic of this formal definition is that, due to the
fact that the set of axioms is recursive (although possibly infinite), there is a mechanical
way to verify if a given sequence of formulae of the formalized language is a derivation or
not. (This should not be confused with the possibility of a mechanical method to verify if
a given formula is a theorem of T or not. The well-known undecidability theorem states
that the latter cannot be verified by a mechanical method for sufficiently strong theories.)
This feature of derivations is the reason of their important role in the construction of
formalized theories. Once a (alleged) derivation is presented, there is a mechanical way to
verify its correctness, and in the case of a positive verdict, to assert that the last formula
of the derivation is indeed a theorem of the theory T .
2 Statement of position
Since the formulation of Hilbert’s program, most of the discussions concerning reasons for
confidence in mathematical theorems are conducted along the axis between formalists and
their opponents. In a nutshell, the first group asserts that derivations underlying proofs
actually carried out in mathematical practice are the reason to believe those theorems,
while the second group dismisses or significantly weakens the role of those derivations in
building confidence in theorems, and points out to other features of proofs, such as the
analysis of the meaning of mathematical notions, as well as to social factors, as responsible
for the beliefs in mathematical statements. Hence, while the radical interpretation of
Hilbert’s program, as expressed in the famous Problem Number 2∗ stated in Hilbert’s
address in Paris in 1900, has been shown unfeasible by the later negative results of Go¨del,
a more moderate interpretation, trying to harvest confidence gains from some link between
Hilbert [1900]: I wish to designate the following as the most important among the numerous questions
which can be asked with respect to the axioms: To prove that they are not contradictory, that is, that a
finite number of logical steps based upon them can never lead to a contradictory result. (Italics in original)
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proofs and derivations, is still present and lively in the discussions of the topic.
This controversy between formalists and their opponents is well exemplified by a discussion
between Jody Azzouni and Yehuda Rav in a sequence of papers Rav [1999], Azzouni [2004],
and Rav [2007]. In this discussion Azzouni presents a moderate formalist point of view
which he calls the derivation-indicator view, while Rav opposes his arguments. Azzouni’s
view is well summarized in the abstract of Azzouni [2004], where he says:
A version of Formalism is vindicated: Ordinary mathematical proofs indi-
cate (one or another) mechanically checkable derivation of theorems from the
assumptions those ordinary mathematical proofs presuppose. The indicator
view explains why mathematicians agree so readily on results established by
proofs in ordinary language that are (palpably) not mechanically checkable.
The present paper is not an exception from the rule that reasons of mathematical beliefs
are discussed along the controversy between formalists and non-formalists. We choose
Azzouni [2004] as a protagonist of the formalist point of view because his position is
moderate†: we want to show that even such a moderate position is impossible to maintain.
However, our opposition to the views expressed by Azzouni [2004] is presented from a
standpoint much different from that of Rav [2007]. In fact, we will argue that the critique
of Azzouni as proposed by Rav [2007] is too harsh in some aspects and too mild in others.
To summarize our position, we will argue that:
1. If reasonably short derivations could be carried out for all mathematical theorems
then significant gains of confidence in these theorems could be obtained.
2. The premise of the above statement is not known to be true in the present state of
knowledge.
3. No link between derivations and proofs can contribute to increasing confidence in
theorems in the present state of knowledge.
†For example, it is further said in the abstract of Azzouni [2004]: “Mechanically checkable derivations
in this way structure ordinary mathematical practice without its being the case that ordinary mathemat-
ical proofs can be ’reduced to’ such derivations.”
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4. Confidence in theorems may be a dynamic attitude and is obtained through a social
process.
Hence we think that Rav’s critique of the formalist position is too strong when he says
(Rav [2007], page 306, italics in the original):
Let F(*) denote the resulting formalization of the proof of Theorem (*) as
a derivation, obtainable in the way as has just been indicated calling upon,
as must have been noted, a logician’s know-how. One can write now a com-
puter program for checking mechanically whether the derivation is valid, or,
alternatively, code the proof in the AUTOMATH language of [de Bruijn, 1970]
and use its computer implementation for the mechanical checking. Suppose
now that the verdict of the computerized proof-checker is ‘not valid’. Do we
conclude that Theorem (*) is false, or do we conclude that somewhere along
the way in the formalization or computer program there is a ‘bug’ ? (Rhetor-
ical question.) Next suppose that the computer verdict says ‘valid’. Do we
now have more confidence in the ‘truth’ (or validity) of Theorem (*)? Are we
now reassured that the (informal) proof with which we have started is correct,
or have we thereby just been reassured that the whole exercise of formaliza-
tion and mechanical checking have been carried out correctly? (Once more a
rhetorical question.)
and continues in a footnote:
As a matter of fact, when a human agent has transcribed an informal proof
as a derivation in a suitably chosen formal system, there is a conceivable loss
in the reliability in the formalized derivation by comparison to the original
informal proof, since the correct reading of the informal proof by the human
agent and its resulting transcription cannot be mechanically checked (at the
pain of an infinite regress!).
Indeed, while we agree that a hypothetical negative computer verdict would be inconclusive
(it would amount to the statement: “you missed this time, try again”), we will argue that a
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hypothetical positive computer verdict would increase our confidence, not in the informal
proof that has been successfully formalized as a derivation, but in the theorem itself.
However, the key point in our argument, that positions the present author firmly in the
antiformalist camp, is that such a computer verdict is impossible. (Note the italics in the
word “hypothetical”, used above twice.)
On the other hand, when Rav says (Rav [2007], page 294, italics in the original):
Consequently, when it comes to the nature of the logical justification of
mathematical arguments in proofs, with Azzouni putting his faith in formal
derivations, even if just indicated, and further maintaining that on this basis
proofs are recognized by mathematicians as valid, as they see them hence
being mechanically checkable, against such formalist-mechanist claims I have
objections to voice, both on technical and on historical grounds. As opposed
to various formalist views, I hold that mathematical proofs are cemented via
arguments based on the meaning of the mathematical terms that occur in
them, which by their very conceptual nature cannot be captured by formal
calculi.
his critique is too mild. Indeed, we will argue that not only do mathematical proofs contain
ingredients that cannot be captured by formal calculi but, in fact, no link between those
proofs and hypothetical derivations underlying them can be established, in case of many
theorems. Thus, while Rav argues that there is added epistemic value in proofs with
respect to derivations, we make a much stronger claim: in the case of many theorems,
derivations cannot contribute any epistemic value at all.
3 The convincing power of short derivations
In this section we justify our first claim: if short derivations were possible to carry out for
all mathematical theorems, then significant gains of confidence in these theorems could
be obtained. Later on we will argue that the premise of this claim is not true, so, from the
point of view of formal logic, the above claim seems to have no interest, as every sentence
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is implied by a false statement. However, this claim is quite important to explain our
position regarding the convincing power of derivations. It shows in particular that the
possibly prohibitive length of derivations is the only reason why confidence in theorems
cannot be gained from a (hypothetical) link between proofs and derivations. This is in
sharp contrast with the above quoted opinion of Rav [2007] that even if such derivations
could be carried out and (using his terminology) a positive “computer verdict” concerning
the correctness of the derivation could be given, this would not increase our confidence,
and that such confidence would even be decreased in the course of formalization, as
compared to the confidence drawn from the original (informal) proof.
In order to justify our claim, we propose the following thought experiment. For the
purpose of the experiment we fix an axiomatized theory, for example Zermelo-Fraenkel
set theory with the Axiom of Choice (ZFC), in which derivations will be carried out.
Moreover we assume (this is for the purpose of the experiment only, we would certainly
not maintain such an absurd position) that all theorems published in mathematical papers
have short derivations in ZFC, of 1000 steps at most. Of course, any previously published
result can be used in such derivations and counts as one step. Hence in order to obtain
a “pure” derivation of a theorem added late in the process, i.e., a derivation that would
not contain references to previously published results, the 1000-step derivation of it would
have to be “unfolded” by inserting derivations of all previous theorems that it uses, these
derivations should be again “unfolded”, and so on. The final “pure” derivation (not using
any previous theorems) could of course be quite long, much longer than 1000 steps, but
not arbitrarily long: any step of it had to be recorded some time earlier in the process,
by some previous author. This crucial fact will be used later in our negative argument.
Coming back to our thought experiment, we further assume that such derivations can
be easily, although tediously, obtained given a standard well-written (informal) proof.
Hence we suppose a situation similar to that in computer science, where an average
programmer can write a program in a computer language, given a (thoroughly written)
informal algorithm.
Suppose also that given this hypothetical situation, all mathematical journals introduced
a new requirement at the time of submitting a paper for publication. As an appendix to
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the paper itself, the author is asked to attach derivations (in ZFC) of all results of the
paper. Before the paper is sent to the referees, a technical assistant to the editor feeds all
appended derivations to a computer program that checks if a given derivation is correct.
If all derivations pass the test, the paper goes through the normal refereeing process.
If not, the paper is sent back to the author with the indication which steps of which
derivations failed the test and with a suggestion of correcting errors and resubmitting the
paper. The checking program itself is in public domain, is the same for all journals, and is
itself thoroughly checked by the mathematical and computer science community. (Such a
program verifying derivations would be itself quite short and easy to check for correctness,
in the informal sense. Writing such a program is an easy programming exercise).
To continue with our experiment, if the paper is finally accepted (according to the usual
refereeing criteria, no changes here), at the time of its publishing, every theorem of the
paper receives a unique Correctness Identification Number (CIN) published together with
the theorem. When another (or the same) author wants to use this result in a subsequent
paper, the CIN of this theorem has to be quoted in the attached derivation. All derivations
are deposited in a central Archive of Derivations (possibly maintained by Google?). When
the computer program checking derivations encounters a step quoting an existing result,
it verifies its CIN in the central archive and checks if the quoted formulation in the
currently verified step matches exactly the formulation of the theorem with this CIN,
kept in the archive. In this way the new derivation is incorporated in the universal bank
of derivations, and can be added to the archive when the new paper is published.
Our thought experiment is completed, it is time to discuss its results. Before arguing in
what way such a hypothetical system would increase our confidence in published mathe-
matical theorems, we should point out what it would not accomplish. (We are far from
suggesting that even such a hypothetical scenario would be a miraculous remedy for all
doubts concerning mathematical truth.) First it should be clear that no epistemic gains in
the sense of increased mathematical knowledge could be obtained from such a system: we
would not learn new ideas or techniques, we would not gain any insight in the importance
of the results of a given paper. Further, the system would not even necessarily increase
the confidence in the correctness of the published proof (only, as we will argue, in the
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proved result). Indeed, since the relation between the (informal) proof and the accompa-
nying derivation would not be externally controlled, it is theoretically possible (although
highly unlikely) that a flawed proof would somehow lead to a correct derivation. (Such a
situation, although possible, is unlikely, because the flaw in the proof would be probably
discovered and corrected during the production of the correct derivation.)
It should be also clear that a rejection of the derivation by the checking program does
not mean that the result is false, or even that the informal proof on which the derivation
was based is incorrect. It only points to errors in the derivation that could be hopefully
corrected by the author before resubmission. This is similar to the usual debugging
process in the production of computer programs. Finally, such a system would certainly
not provide any deciding procedure for either the truth or provability of mathematical
statements. (It is well known that such a procedure cannot exist.) The modest goal of
the system would just be to verify if a derivation of a result (provided by the author) is
correct and to maintain the (gigantic) graph of such derivations with links pointing from
a given derivation to previously accepted results used in it.
The only potential gain from the above described hypothetical verification system could
be the gain of confidence in published theorems. Let us analyze it more closely. What kind
of confidence should we have in a result, seeing that it got published in the hypothetical
system and thus got a CIN certificate? Looking at the above described process, the reader
will hopefully agree that:
- if we believe the axioms of ZFC and the axioms of logic,
- if we consider that the inference rules used in derivations, such as modus ponens, do not
decrease our belief in the infered statement as compared to the premises,
- if we believe that the checking program is correct,
- if we believe that the hardware of the computer on which the checking program runs is
correct,
- if we believe that the technical assistant is honest (does not, for example, type a false
correctness certificate),
then we should believe the theorem whose derivation obtained a positive verdict. This
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is not to say that we should believe the correctness of the proof on which the derivation
is based: as justly pointed out by Rav [2007] (see the quotation above): “the correct
reading of the informal proof by the human agent and its resulting transcription cannot
be mechanically checked”. All that we claim is that, under the above five assumptions,
we should believe the theorem itself. This is a modest claim: let us examine in what way
the belief would actually be increased with respect to the current (real) situation.
There are five conditions on our newly acquired (hypothetical) belief: the first two con-
cern philosophical belief in axioms and logical rules, the third concerns the belief in the
correctness of a very simple computer program, the fourth concerns the belief in the
soundness of technology, and the fifth concerns the belief in the honesty of a particular
human. Hence our belief is clearly not absolute. In order to analyze how strong it should
be, we need to examine all the conditions, as the chain is only as strong as its weakest
link.
Concerning the first two conditions it is enough to say that we cannot expect the belief
in a (possibly complicated) theorem to be stronger than the belief in axioms of ZFC and
the axioms of logic, that are simple, intuitively obvious statements, and stronger than
the belief in the soundness of rules like modus ponens. It seems that denying the belief
in the above precludes the belief in any mathematical statements and thus renders our
discussion uninteresting. (Here we put aside the issue of doubt in some particular, more
problematic axioms of ZFC, like the Axiom of Choice, not accepted by all mathematicians
in its strongest form. For most results in mathematics, a quite weak form of the Axiom
of Choice is sufficient, a form accepted by most mathematicians, and we might modify
the ZFC system in our experiment to such a weaker system.)
The third condition may be considered a weak point in our network of beliefs: the checking
program may be obviously incorrect. However, as mentioned before, the checking program
would be very simple, and – being in public domain – could be independently checked
by thousands of people. Thus, although theoretically it would be prone to errors, as any
result of human activity, the practical confidence in it (after years of testing and using)
would be very high.
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As for the fourth condition, it is enough to say that hardware faults in computers are
extremely rarely the cause of erroneous results; human factors are much more often to
blame in this respect. Another argument is that, if we believe (as we probably all do) in
fault-free functioning of computer hardware in monitoring life-saving medical equipment
and flight control systems, we should not be more suspicious in the case of computer
derivation checking.
Finally, the technical assistant honesty issue: a delicate point, since, as we know, there
is no lack of dishonest individuals in the world. Here the argument is similar as above:
we trust the honesty of pharmacists to give us the correct medicine and the honesty of
aircraft pilots when they claim that they are not under the influence of drugs or alcohol
when flying the plane. Their dishonesty could cost lives. Should we be less trusting of
the honesty of editor assistants?
We have hopefully established that the hypothetical system verifying derivations would
practically confer quite a high degree of confidence in the theorems in mathematical lit-
erature. Would this confidence be higher than in the actual current situation? In other
words, could we then talk about a gain in confidence? This author feels that the answer to
this question is “yes”. Let us consider the following situation in which we believe that our
confidence in a theorem would indeed increase, if we could use the hypothetical system.
Suppose that we want to use a little-known result published in an obscure journal. The
proof is long, difficult to understand, and far from our domain of expertise. In fact, we
are not interested in the proof at all, we need the result itself, as a “black box” in our
argument. We do not have the time, desire, or ability to go through the proof in order to
check that it is correct. In this case, a CIN of the obscure theorem (obtained via the above
described process) would definitely increase our confidence by substantially lowering the
risk that the result we are about to use is wrong.
Unfortunately, as already stressed several times above, the derivation verifying system
is purely hypothetical. We will argue in the next section that such a system could not
be implemented. Indeed, the crucial assumption of our thought experiment, that short
derivations are possible to carry out for all (published) mathematical theorems, is bla-
tantly false.
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4 Impossibility of gaining confidence from derivations
In this section we present the main negative claim of this paper. We will argue that, in the
present state of knowledge, it is impossible to gain any confidence in most mathematical
theorems from hypothetical derivations underlying their proofs. Hence we will argue
against the statement of Azzouni [2004] who says (page 83):
it’s derivations, derivations in one or another algorithmic system, which
underlie what’s characteristic of mathematical practice: in particular, the so-
cial conformity of mathematicians with respect to whether one or another
proof is or isn’t (should be, or shouldn’t be) convincing.
Recall that we concluded from our thought experiment in Section 3 that if reasonably
short derivations of mathematical results could be explicitly written, then they would
contribute to a significant gain of confidence in the theorem under scrutiny. Hence it is
not surprising that our impossibility argument concerning such a gain in reality is based
on length considerations concerning such hypothetical derivations.
It should be stressed that our impossibility claim is quite strong. We want to argue that
not only mathematicians do not in practice use derivations to get or increase confidence
in their results, but that in the present state of knowledge it is theoretically impossible to
achieve such a gain of confidence, in the case of most interesting mathematical theorems.
Since we want to argue against the above quoted statement of Azzouni, we should try to
understand what he means by saying that derivations “underlie what’s characteristic of
mathematical practice”. First we should ask: what exactly is an algorithmic system and
derivations in which algorithmic system? Azzouni [2004] provides a kind of answer to the
first question, saying in the footnote to the above quote: “An algorithmic system is one
where the recognition procedure for proofs is mechanically implementable. By no means
are algorithmic systems restricted to language-based axiom systems.” He is more vague
as far as the choice of a specific system is concerned (page 93):
...the picture doesn’t require mathematicians, in any case, when studying a
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subject-matter, to remain within the confines of a single (algorithmic) system
indeed, if anything, mathematicians are required to transcend such systems by
embedding them in larger ones. The derivation indicated (by the application
of new tools to a given subject matter) can be a derivation of the weaker
system the mathematician started with, or it can be a derivation of a stronger
system (some of) the terms of which are taken to pick out the same items
supposedly referred to in the weaker system.
Nevertheless, for a given theorem in mind, we have to focus on a particular “algorithmic
system” (while agreeing that this system could be modified several times in the course
of developing the proof of the theorem). Derivations in an axiomatized theory, such as
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the Axiom of Choice (ZFC) are in principle mechanically
checkable (when written correctly), hence we will use the system ZFC as an example of an
algorithmic system in which derivations are “indicated” by usual proofs, to use Azzouni’s
terminology. ZFC is a good example because many mathematicians believe that most of
the mathematical lore could be in principle formalized in this system. Actually, defining
other mathematical notions (such as functions, relations, algebraic systems) in terms of
sets is a standard mathematical practice which can be considered as a step in the direction
of such a formalization. (Further steps are usually not made).
Next we should see what Azzouni means by saying that proofs “indicate” derivations.
This point is somewhat obscure, as a precise definition of this relation between proofs
and derivations is never given in his paper. To be sure, Azzouni [2004] is well aware of
the fact that “mechanically recognizable derivations ... (generally) aren’t ones (that can
be) exhibited in practice” (page 95, italics in the original). However, the very fact of his
stressing that derivations are not exhibited in practice points to the important distinction
between practical considerations and a theoretical accessibility of such derivations. This
is also implied by his statement “it’s derivation which provides the skeleton for (the
flesh of) proof” (page 95, italics in the original). In order to provide such a skeleton, a
derivation should be at least theoretically accessible for scrutiny, and hence it should be
at least theoretically possible to record and verify it. Since Azzouni stresses mechanical
checkability as an important feature of derivations, it is thus fair to assume that, whatever
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could be the precise meaning of the phrase “proofs indicate derivations”, it should be
theoretically possible to mechanically check such indicated derivations.
Now comes a crucial remark that forms the basis of our impossibility argument. Since
Azzouni (and other formalists) claim that confidence concerning theorems is somehow
linked to derivations underlying proofs, the burden of justifying that such (indicated)
derivations are (at least theoretically) possible to be recorded and mechanically checked
is on their side, in every case when such a gain of confidence is claimed. A caveat is
in order here. Formalists do not need to actually exhibit an indicated derivation, but
they should justify that such a derivation is theoretically possible to be recorded and
mechanically checked. This theoretical possibility is a necessary condition for such a gain
of confidence and hence should be justified by anybody claiming the gain. There is an
important asymmetry with respect to the “burden of justification”. In order to counter
this formalist claim for a given theorem, there is no need to show that such a mechanically
checkable derivation is theoretically impossible; it is enough to show that the formalist side
has not justified the theoretical possibility of mechanical checking of such a derivation.
We will argue that this is the case, and hence that the claimed confidence gain cannot be
harvested.
Before proceeding with our impossibility argument, a disclaimer is in order. Our argument
refers to “complex”, “deep” theorems, as opposed to simple corollaries from definitions,
such as the unicity of the neutral element in groups, or simple geometric theorems, e.g.,
that the sum of angles of a triangle totals pi. For the latter two examples it is not hard to
imagine a derivation in ZFC; it is probably even possible (although very likely a terribly
boring task) to write it explicitly and thus, according to our thought experiment from
Section 3, which should be possible to actually carry out in such simple cases, to gain
confidence in those results. (As a counter-argument we might notice that confidence in
these simple results is extremely high anyway, so the additional potential gain would be
small, if not non-existent.) Of course, the above notions of “complex”, “deep” theorems
are very fuzzy, which is the reason to put them in quotation marks. However, hardly
any mathematician will disagree that the Fermat Last Theorem proved by Wiles [1995]
is both complex and deep (no need of quotation marks in this case). Hence we will use
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this theorem, refered to as FLT , as an example in our impossibility argument.
We should also stress that the choice of ZFC as the underlying axiomatic system in which
derivations are indicated by usual proofs is only given as an example. It could be replaced
by any normally used system such as Peano Arithmetic, Kelley-Morse theory of classes,
etc., whose axioms and inference rules people find intuitively obvious. Of course one might
create an artificial system, e.g., containing FLT as an axiom (in which the derivation of
FLT would have length one), but such manipulations cannot possibly increase confidence
in this theorem.
The starting point of our argument is the following controversy between Rav [1999] and
Azzouni [2004]. Rav [1999] (page 14) writes:
In reading a paper or monograph it often happens as everyone knows too
well that one arrives at an impasse, not seeing why a certain claim B is to
follow from claim A, as its author affirms. Let us symbolise the author’s claim
by ‘A → B’ . (The arrow functions iconically: there is an informal logical
path from A to B. It does not denote formal implication.) Thus, in trying to
understand the author’s claim, one picks up paper and pencil and tries to fill
in the gaps. After some reflection on the background theory, the meaning of
the terms and using one’s general knowledge of the topic, including eventually
some symbol manipulation, one sees a path from A to A1, from A1 to A2,
. . . , and finally from An to B. This analysis can be written schematically as
follows:
A→ A1, A1 → A2, . . . , An → B.
Explaining the structure of the argument to a student or non-specialist, the
other may still fail to see why, for instance, A1 ought to follow from A. So
again we interpolate A→ A′, A′ → A1 . But the process of interpolations for
a given claim has no theoretical upper bound. In other words, how far has one
to analyse a claim of the form ‘from property A, B follows’ before assenting to
it depends on the agent. There is no theoretical reason to warrant the belief
that one ought to arrive at an atomic claim C → D which does not allow
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or necessitate any further justifying steps between C and D. This is one of
the reasons for considering proofs as infinitary objects. Both Brouwer and
Zermelo, each for different reasons, stressed the infinitary character of proofs.
and Azzouni [2004] (page 97) responds:
What’s going on? Why should anyone think that a finitary piece of math-
ematical reasoning, a step in a proof, say, corresponds to something infinitary
(if, that is, we attempt to translate it into a derivation)?
While we agree with the main thought of Rav [1999], it seems that the use of the word
“infinitary” may have been exaggerated. It is this word and not the argument itself that
seems to have provoked the controversy. What we consider as the crux of Rav’s reasoning
is that there is no clearly defined upper bound on the number of justifying steps. If the
argument is presented in this way, there is no need to invoke any infinitary character of
the proof, that raised Azzouni’s objections. Our impossibility argument will be based on
this important distinction. (In the sequel we never make any claims about an infinitary
character of proofs or derivations. Similarly as Azzouni, we believe that these are finite
objects.)
For any theorem T whose derivation (or many derivations) in ZFC are indicated (accord-
ing to Azzouni’s terminology), by its “ordinary” published proof, let L(T ) denote the
length of the shortest possible derivation (not only among those derivations indicated by
the particular considered proof, but among all possible derivations of T in ZFC). Such
derivations exist since, by assumption, they are indicated by the ordinary proof. Hence
the integer L(T ) is well defined. We conjecture that in the case of most “complex”, “deep”
theorems T , and in particular in the case of FLT , it is impossible to provide (and justify)
any upper bound on L(T ). We agree that this is a bold statement but we would like
to challenge a skeptical reader to provide (and justify!) any upper bound on L(FLT ).
Should it be a million? a quadrillion? 1010
10
? What would be the justification of the
choice of any such number? Actually, of any number at all? To be sure, we have not
proved that it is impossible to give such an estimate, we only conjectured it. Nevertheless,
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and this time it is not a conjecture but a statement of a fact: nobody (including formalists
claiming confidence gains from derivations underlying proofs) has ever given any such es-
timate. This simple observation is the first crucial claim in our argument. Our conjecture
is stronger and says that such an estimate is impossible to establish, but it will not be
used in the argument: due to the asymmetry with respect to the “burden of proof”, the
fact that such an estimate has not been given will be enough for our reasoning.
The next step of our argument requires the definition of a very large integer number M ,
an extremely large number, indeed. We are not concerned with determining the size of
this number. The only thing that matters for our purposes is that no derivation of length
larger thanM could ever be actually written down or verified mechanically, even in theory.
We will proceed with a series of estimates leading to the definition of M . First consider
the period of time known as the Planck time (cf. Halliday et al. [1996]). This interval of
time, call it tP , of length of order 10
−43 seconds, is a lower bound on the duration of any
observable physical event, and hence it is also a lower bound on the time needed for any
conceivable processing device to record or verify one step of a derivation. Next, switching
to the macroscale, consider a future state of the universe precluding any information
processing activity. A good candidate for such a state would be the heat death of the
universe, i.e., when the universe has reached maximum entropy. Let τ denote an upper
bound (in seconds) on the time till this state of the universe is reached. Let Q = τ/tP .
Hence Q is an upper bound on the number of steps of a derivation that can ever be
recorded or verified by a single processing device. It is of course possible that many
processing devices cooperate in verifying some derivation in parallel, each processing unit
working on a different part of the derivation. Hence we need a third estimate, an upper
bound on the number of elementary particles in the observable universe. Call this number
P . Clearly, any processing device must be composed of at least one particle, hence the
number of such conceivable devices is at most P . Finally letM = P ·Q. It follows that the
maximum number of derivation steps that could ever be recorded or verified is bounded
by M . In other words, a derivation of length larger than M could never be verified, even
if the entire observable universe were converted into a machine totally devoted to the
verification of this single derivation.
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It should be noted that all our estimates leading to the definition of M are grossly exag-
gerated: the time of recording or verifying one step of a derivation is much larger than tP ,
any computing activity in the universe would stop sooner than after τ seconds, and the
number of processing devices in a hypothetical verifying machine is much smaller than P .
As a consequence, our claim concerning the number M could be even made about a much
smaller number. However, we chose to use the above exaggerated estimates because, for
the purpose of our argument, we only need to indicate some number bounding the length
of a theoretically verifiable derivation, and the number M has the advantage of being
rather simple to define and of not leaving any doubt concerning the validity of our claim
about it.
Consider a derivation of length larger than M . The hypothetical existence of such a
derivation of a theorem T could not possibly contribute to our confidence in T because we
could never have any kind of access (even theoretically) to all terms of such an extremely
large sequence of formulae, and hence we could never verify that it is indeed a correct
derivation. Trying to gain any confidence concerning the validity of theorem T from the
existence of such a hypothetical derivation is (metaphorically speaking) similar to getting
insight into a black hole.
Let us now call a theorem T reachable, if L(T ) ≤ M . In other words, a theorem is
reachable, if and only if there exists its derivation in ZFC of length at most M . It follows
from what was said above that reachability of a theorem is a necessary condition for
gaining any confidence in it from some hypothetical derivation of this theorem.
Now we are ready for the third, final step of our argument. Consider the theorem FLT .
Since no upper bound on L(FLT ) has been justifiably provided, the answer to the question
of whether FLT is reachable is unknown. Given the fact that the number M is so
enormous, one would be tempted to give the answer “yes” to this question, i.e., to establish
M as an upper bound on L(FLT ). However, as observed before, this has never been done
(and seems impossible to do, although we do not need this stronger conjecture in our
argument). To avoid misunderstandings: we are not claiming that FLT is not reachable,
we are only arguing that the answer to this question is unknown.
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We can now conclude that, since in the case of FLT (and the reasoning would be similar
in the case of many other “complex”, “deep” theorems) we are unable to decide – in
the present state of knowledge – whether FLT is reachable, there can be no gain of
confidence from indicating any derivation of FLT . Indeed, as observed at the beginning
of our argument, the side claiming such a gain has the burden of justifying that for some
derivation of FLT it is theoretically possible to mechanically check it. This however would
imply reachability of FLT , which, as previously argued, is not known to be true.
We would like to present the following analogy. A biologist studying animals’ behavior
or a trainer working with animals considers such notions as fear, anger, pain, or sexual
attraction, and tries to explain various actions of animals (attacking, running away, mat-
ing, etc.) in these terms. However, these actions could also be explained at some lower
level, the level of biochemical reactions in the animal’s brain, or even at a subatomic level,
involving statistical information about motions of particles. It is clear that these lower
levels (especially the subatomic one) are not very useful in explaining and predicting the
animal’s behavior: they are too detailed. Likewise, a proof of a theorem should be ex-
plained at a “macroscopic” level, involving mathematical objects and principal techniques,
rather than at a “subatomic” derivation level. However, we would like to observe that the
analogy ends at this point. Indeed, the subatomic level in the case of living organisms can
be (indirectly) observed. Hence one may argue that (with suitable hypothetical tools) we
may be able to gain additional biological knowledge studying such a microscopic level.
In the case of mathematical theorems, the accessibility of this “subatomic” level, i.e.,
the level of derivations, is quite different. The core of the problem is their mechanical
verifiability. As previously argued, in the case of particular theorems, these objects may
be too large to be written, perceived (in any possible sense), let alone to be scrutinized
for mechanical verification. So while in biology it is unlikely but theoretically possible
that the subatomic level can provide additional insight into animals’ behavior, such a
possibility (even theoretical) may not exist in mathematics in the case of many theorems,
for a simple but crucial reason: the size of objects at the “subatomic ” level (i.e., at the
level of derivations) may be too large to be examined with the aim of verification by a
human mind, or by any technological device.
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Finally, it should be stressed that, as previously mentioned, our impossibility argument
concerns the present state of knowledge. In other words, we argued that it is now impos-
sible (even theoretically) to gain additional confidence concerning the validity of theorems
such as FLT by “indicating” their derivations. Indeed, we based our argument on the
observation that the question of whether FLT is reachable has not been settled until now.
This impossibility at present is enough to refute Azzouni’s [2004] claim, which is made
about such gains of confidence at present. It is of course hard to predict how the situation
could change with additional insights in the future. If, for example, short derivations of
all published mathematical theorems were discovered one day (a very unlikely but not
completely impossible scenario) then the situation would resemble our thought experi-
ment from Section 3 and Azzouni’s claim could be substantiated. This, however, does
not concern our discussion whose purpose was refuting the possibility of such confidence
gains now, a claim made by the formalist side.
5 Psychological and social aspects of believing
theorems
It follows from the arguments in Section 4 that derivations cannot increase our confidence
in most important mathematical theorems, in the present state of knowledge. Since these
formal well-defined objects are of no help, we have to seek reasons of such belief elsewhere.
We will argue that a combination of psychological and social factors is responsible for our
confidence in theorems. This idea is not new. De Millo, Lipton and Perlis [1979] (page
272) say: “ ... insofar as it is successful, mathematics is a social, informal, intuitive,
organic, human process, a community project”. Thomas [1990] (page 80) is even more
explicit:
A public [mathematical] statement is regarded as true when the mathe-
matical community can be convinced that it has been properly deduced from
what is already explicit in the public mathematics.
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However, we will provide (hopefully) new arguments for the importance of psychological
and social factors in building (or destroying) belief in theorems. Rather than adopting a
static approach that concentrates on the issue of which elements of proofs are likely to
convince mathematicians, we will discuss dynamic aspects of beliefs, and try to answer
the question of how and why such beliefs change in time, both at an individual level and
at the level of the mathematical community. We will also argue that confidence in a
particular theorem (even in a fixed point in time) is not a totally universal attitude: it
may depend on the individual mathematician.
In order to give an example of psychological and social factors involved in forming our
beliefs concerning the validity of theorems, we propose our second thought experiment.
Consider the following theorems:
S1: Your own recent result that you have just written down and submitted to a journal
(here we assume that the reader is a mathematician in the large sense, mentioned in the
introduction).
S2: A Ph.D. thesis result by a brilliant young mathematician, published in the recent
issue of a reputable journal.
S3: An insignificant result in graph theory, with a very complicated proof, published in
the proceedings of an obscure conference in 1970 ∗ (here we assume that the reader is
not an expert in graph theory).
S4: The Simple Group Classification Theorem (the so called “Enormous Theorem”).
S5: The Pythagorean Theorem.
S6: The Riemann Mapping Theorem (here we assume that the reader is not a specialist
in complex analysis).
Now suppose that somebody proposes you the following bet, concerning each of the above
statements separately. If, within a year from the bet, the statement is shown false (in a
way so convincing that you will agree with this yourself) then you pay $10,000; otherwise
you get $10,000. On which of these statements would you bet (assuming that you do not
∗For obvious reasons, no example is given, not because of lack thereof.
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dismiss the very idea of betting for reasons independent of beliefs concerning the subject
of the bet, e.g., for moral or religious reasons)? The advantage of setting the experiment
in the framework of a bet is that the will to bet (especially a large sum of money) reflects
rather well what the parties believe and how strongly, regardless of the reason for such
beliefs. Moreover, this setting has the advantage of “discretization” of the inherently
gradual nature of beliefs: while we may “somewhat” or “almost” believe a theorem, a bet
is necessarily a 0-1 decision.
Now let us perform a reasoning that, we think, reflects to some extent the decision process
in which an average mathematician would engage in this situation. At least this is the
reasoning that this author would make and the reader is invited to compare how he or
she would react. Let us look at the statements one by one.
S1 concerns your own result and proof. Shouldn’t we believe that our own work is correct?
Of course we should and we do, often too strongly... How often does one get a referee’s
report saying that Theorem 2.3 is not correct as it is written because some (hopefully
insignificant) assumption is missing, or the statement is true not for all topological spaces
but for all except the singleton space. Such mistakes are easy to correct but, according
to the rules of the bet, would be sufficient to lose it. Unfortunately, referees sometimes
also spot more serious mistakes in places completely unsuspected by the inventor of the
proof. Hence, this author would, reluctantly, refuse the bet in the case of S1.
Should we bet on S2? It looks really good: at least two independent experts (we are
talking about a reputable journal) agreed that the proof is correct. However, with some
hesitation, this author would likely again refrain from the bet. After all, $10,000 is a lot
of money for a university professor, and this author has seen a few false results even in
reputable journals. What is lacking in the case of S2 is the opportunity for more members
of the mathematical community to look at the proof, possibly use its ideas and confront
it with background knowledge in the domain: this is the way errors are often found. Such
an opportunity requires some time after publication of the proof.
In the case of S3, the main risk lies in the possibility that nobody except the author
has ever carefully looked at the proof. Although almost forty years elapsed since its
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publication, the insignificance of the result combined with the length and complications
of the proof and the fact that the paper is “buried” in an obscure place, make this quite
plausible. Moreover, conference proceedings of this type are sometimes not refereed or
refereed only superficially, so there is a good chance that nobody except the author has
seen the paper also prior to publication. Hence the danger here is even larger than in the
case of S2, in spite of the age of the result. Too much of a risk, at least for this author.
In the case of S4 the decision is really difficult. This is a very well-known and thoroughly
discussed result and (parts of various versions of) the proof have been seen by many
mathematicians. The proof of the Simple Group Classification Theorem is spread over
tens of thousands of pages in about 500 papers, some of them unpublished. Many math-
ematicians expressed serious doubts about the correctness of the proof at various stages
of its development, serious gaps were found and subsequently corrected (cf. Aschbacher
[2004]). Some experts still doubt that the current version of the proof is correct. Needless
to say, personal verification of the entire proof is out of the question for almost everyone.
Not a betting case for now, according to this author.
Now comes S5: this is a moneymaker – no doubt about jumping on the bet. Why? Is it
absolutely impossible for the Pythagorean Theorem to be wrong? Well, not absolutely...
It is theoretically possible that all people writing, reading and teaching various (simple)
proofs of this theorem over the ages were completely blind to some obvious error in
them and that the result itself is incorrect because of this overlooked error. There is no
theoretical way to exclude such a possibility. Nevertheless, everyone would agree that
this is so extremely unlikely that it should not prevent even the most cautious person
from betting on the theorem. Here we have a very reassuring combination of evidence:
the proof is simple, possible to be readily checked by any mathematician (or even non-
mathematician), including the person about to bet, and historical data show that it was,
in fact, checked and used by countless people over centuries, without creating a shade of
doubt. This is probably the highest degree of confidence (we use this term in an informal,
everyday sense) that a mathematician can get about the correctness of a result.
The final candidate is S6, the Riemann Mapping Theorem. This is a very important and
well-known result in complex analysis, proved by Riemann in 1851 in his Ph.D. thesis. His
24
proof, however, contained some hypotheses that were subsequently proved to be invalid
in some cases. The first correct proof was given by Carathe´odory in 1912. Subsequently
other, simpler proofs were given by other mathematicians and the result itself, as well
as techniques of these proofs, were used ever since. Here the betting decision is made
in a slightly different context than in the case of the Pythagorean Theorem. Most non-
specialists in complex analysis have probably never personally checked the proof, and
actually most of them (this author included) have never seen it. However, the result and
its various proofs are very important, old and well known, which guarantees that they
have been successfully checked and used by many people. Thus (without even spending
time to try to look at any of the proofs by himself) this author would bet on S6 without
hesitation.
Our thought experiment is over: in the case of S5 or S6 we would probably cash a hefty
check after a year, in other cases we might well regret excessive caution, if the young
brilliant mathematician really found a correct proof (or even if the proof was incorrect
and the result false but no one found any mistake in it within a year), if the obscure
graph theoretic result was valid and the proof correct (although long and boring), and
if no new dramatic negative developments concerning the Enormous Theorem occurred
within a year.
Now let us consider the outcome of the experiment. Its usefulness lies more in the pre-
sented reasoning behind each decision (we think that these reasonings reflect, to some
extent at least, the decision making process of other mathematicians in such a hypothet-
ical situation), than the decision itself. ∗ The above presented arguments indicate that
the reasons of a belief in a particular mathematical statement are a combination of psy-
chological and social factors. We take into account our personal ability to verify the proof
of a result, the complexity or simplicity of the presented proof which makes it more or less
likely to hide errors and conceptual mistakes, the degree to which the result is established
in the mathematical community (which in turn depends on its visibility, importance and
∗Before discussing what follows from our thought experiment and to avoid misunderstandings, we
should stress what does NOT follow from it. Certainly we do not want to imply any kind of formal
probability measure attached to theorems, in particular connected to some randomized checking of proofs,
such as mentioned and justly criticized by Rav [2007]. All notions of likelihood and risk used here are
informal and purely subjective.
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the time since it has been published), the reputation of the venue, which somehow indi-
cates the seriousness of the refereeing process, known controversies surrounding the proof,
as in the case of the Enormous Theorem, and many other factors, not directly spelled out
above.
An important consequence of the previously presented arguments is that the belief in a
particular result is a dynamic concept: the same result becomes more “worthy of belief”
as time goes by and its proof is reverified and used by others, or, conversely, the belief
in a result may be shattered, if a gap in the proof is revealed (some steps in it shown
to be doubtful), or even worse, if some of the lemmas it uses are shown false. These
dynamic changes in belief may last for years, as it is the case with the Enormous Theorem,
depending on the new developments and critiques of the proof.
It should also be clear that the belief in a theorem depends on the qualifications of the
person pondering its validity. Curiously, the strength of this belief is neither an increasing
nor a decreasing function of these qualifications. On the one hand, a novice may be blocked
at some step of the verification of a proof, not seeing why it is really the case that “B
clearly follows from A” as stated in the journal paper, while an expert will not have any
doubt about this step because he or she has seen it in other proofs and used it many
times before. On the other hand, a novice may “slide” over a doubtful argument, not
even seeing any dangers, where a more experienced reader immediately “sniffs” a real
problem.
Hence it is our opinion that the way in which mathematicians gain (or lose) belief in
particular theorems does not differ radically from what happens in other sciences. The
underlying dynamic social process is similar. When Azzouni [2004] (page 84) says that
“mathematicians are so good at agreeing with one another on whether some proof con-
vincingly establishes a theorem”, he seems to put mathematicians in a completely different
category, than, e.g., specialists in experimental sciences or engineers. We would like to
argue that this is not the case: on the one hand mathematicians are not so good at it,
on the other hand, others are not so bad. To justify the first point let us note three rea-
sons for disagreement between mathematicians, concerning the validity of a given proof:
historical reasons, difference of competence, and mistakes in arguments.
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The historical aspect has been extensively discussed by Rav [2007] who quotes, among
many other papers, the historical analysis of Grabiner [1974]. The latter shows, that, using
the words of Rav [2007] (page 294) “rigor, and hence the type of proofs that are accepted
by the mathematical community, are time-dependent”. This time-dependence is not a
monotonic function. On the one hand, some proofs perfectly acceptable in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, let alone proofs of first results in calculus by Leibniz or Newton,
would not be accepted in a modern journal because the referee would complain that the
author barely conveys some ideas and does not provide any “real” proof of his statements.
The rigor requirements in calculus have significantly increased since its creation. On the
other hand, some type of reasoning rigor becomes relaxed with time, as a particular
method or technique becomes widely known and understood. It is perfectly acceptable
to say in a modern set theory paper “adding ω2 Cohen reals forces property P”, while
this would be considered an obscure statement in the 1960’s, right after the creation by
P.J. Cohen of the method of forcing used to construct models of set theory. Hence the
agreement as to what is convincing and what is not, does not hold across centuries.
The difference of competence and its role in agreeing if some proof is convincing, is well
known to all mathematicians. Obviously, because of social context, a novice, especially
a student, will often not argue about his or her position very strongly, if there is a
controversy about a validity of a proof between him or her and some member of the
academic community higher on the hierarchy ladder. The student may suppose that
the difference of opinion is due to his or her insufficient knowledge or insight. (This
timidity may also be a dangerous thing and should not be encouraged: often mistakes
in proofs are found by young students who try to verify each step of the proof because
they are not sure of anything, and during this slow process find an error, while more
senior colleagues have just perused the proof and “convinced themselves” that everything
is “basically correct”.) Nevertheless the difference of opinions remains a fact, even if it
is only temporary. A consequence of this is well known in the mathematical academic
community: a proof presented at an undergraduate course must substantially differ from
a proof at a conference. MacKenzie [2001] (page 321) justly writes:
[a] sense of audience is crucial to this form of proving: a sense of what
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listeners or readers will know, and of what will be enlightening; of what the
audience will understand, and what they will not; of what needs to be spelt
out, and what can be covered by phrases such as ‘it is obvious that...’, or
‘we can show similarly that...’, or ‘without loss of generality, we can assume
that...’; and so on.
A potential lack of this sense of audience may be a reason for disagreement over the
validity of a result. In the extreme case when an author of a submitted paper does not
succeed in writing a proof in a way that convinces the referees, the latter may finally
reject the paper because they are not sure that the result and the proof are correct, and
several revisions have not remedied the situation.
The third reason for disagreement are existing mistakes in arguments. The example of
the Enormous Theorem shows this issue very explicitly. At what time can we talk about
agreement that the current proof is correct? Will a shade of doubt persist in many years
to come, at least in the minds of some experts? How can we be sure that the (supposed)
belief in correctness will not change in the near future? It is tempting to make the ironic
statement that at any given time the potential agreement can only be about the current
version of the proof being incorrect and needing further modifications.
The above arguments show that Azzouni’s optimism about the ability of mathematicians
to reach agreement which proofs are convincing is somewhat exaggerated. We rather tend
to agree with a more realistic position of Hersh [1979] who says (page 43):
We do not have absolute certainty in mathematics. We may have vir-
tual certainty, just as in other areas of life. Mathematicians disagree, make
mistakes and correct them, are uncertain whether a proof is correct or not ...
Now let us briefly consider the second point: are other communities so much worse at
reaching similar agreements? Let us consider, for example, the civil engineering com-
munity. It does not seem that civil engineers are incapable of reaching an agreement
concerning, say, safety standards in bridge construction. If this were the case, given
the crucial importance of these standards for human lives, bridges would not be built,
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engineers being eternally occupied discussing what standards should be adopted. This
does not seem to be the case. To give an example in more fundamental sciences: physi-
cists seem to be in perfect agreement about, say, laws of optics, at least when restricted
to the everyday environment. Examples in other domains of experimental sciences and
technology are not hard to find.
Hence we would like to argue that the difference between the capability of mathematicians
to reach agreement whether a proof convincingly establishes a theorem and a similar
capability of experts in other domains of, say, experimental sciences and technology being
able to reach agreement about the validity of results in these domains does not form a
black and white picture. When Azzouni [2004] (page 103) says:
It’s not that in mathematics we can’t get things wrong as traditional
philosophers have too often suggested; it’s that mathematicians have a way of
agreeing about proof that is virtually unique (agreement of any sort among
humans is always a surprise, and always has to be explained somehow), and
the explanation of this surely is that some sort of recognition of mechanical
procedures is involved.
we think that Azzouni is wrong both in describing the existing situation and in its expla-
nation. There may be a difference of degree in this capability between mathematicians
and other scientists, but not a qualitative difference. In both cases the process is a social
one. A given community at a given time must be convinced, and the way of convincing it
is always the same: discussion using arguments currently accepted by this community. ∗
One could argue that pointing to a social process of discussion among experts as responsi-
ble for convincing the mathematical community about the validity of theorems is incorrect
because belief in theorems and types of acceptable arguments last much longer than social
structures: the Pythagorean Theorem is still believed, although states of ancient Greece
have fallen long ago. This argument has two flaws. First, the durability of these beliefs is
not always so long. The beliefs in the validity of the Enormous Theorem changed more
∗Cf. Thurston [1994]: ... mathematical truth and reliability come about through the very human
process of people thinking clearly and sharing ideas, criticizing one another and independently checking
things out.
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rapidly than many modern governments. Also, the social feeling of what is an acceptable
argument in a mathematical journal evolves rather rapidly, as some techniques become
widely known and become part of what mathematicians call folklore. More importantly,
the fact that the belief in the main body of mathematical lore transcends social structures
does not mean that it is not dependent on a social process. This process of scientific
discussion, written or oral, is quite similar in Plato’s Academy and in a modern univer-
sity department, and its outcomes are, indeed, usually more lasting than the underlying
social structures, e.g., than those institutions themselves or than countries in which they
operate. This does not refute the fact that consensus concerning a result, or lack thereof,
are precisely outcomes of these scientific discussions. Of course the types of acceptable
arguments vary from domain to domain and are time-dependent. The tools used in the
discussions are very diversified even inside mathematics and include both rigorous parts,
such as calculations, and more informal ones, such as pictures, diagrams, analogies or
even metaphor helping to visualize an argument (e.g., a node of a graph is “killed”, an
area of the plane is “protected”).
The above arguments hopefully convinced the reader that there are no qualitative differ-
ences between the capabilities of mathematicians and of scientists in some other domains
to reach an agreement concerning the validity of an assertion in their respective fields
of expertise. However, one other point requires further discussion. In the case of ex-
perimental sciences it may be argued that observation of the external world causes some
conformity in the way specialists in these domains describe and explain phenomena. This
raises the question of what is the corresponding reason of the (admittedly changing, im-
perfect and far from absolute) agreement among mathematicians concerning the validity
of a large part of the body of mathematics. (Although we argued that not all mathe-
maticians agree on the validity of all theorems at all times, there is no doubt that most
mathematicians agree on the validity of most theorems most of the time.) In the case of
mathematics, observation of the external world cannot be given as a reason.
We would like to consider the answer to this important question at two levels: first
by trying to find the immediate reason for this general conformity, and then by trying
in turn to find the cause of this reason. We think that the immediate reason is this.
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At any given point in time the mathematical community accepts some “rules of the
game”, which are permitted in informal proofs. As argued before, these rules change
over time: some are relaxed (when they become folklore), some are made more precise,
when the old ones have been shown to contain traps. However, if we fix a moment
in the development of mathematics, these rules are fairly universal and respected by
most mathematicians, because most of them are trained on the same proofs, and learn
from the same type of manuals, so they generally accept the same types of arguments.
These rules are not based on derivations, and in fact, were used for centuries before the
concept of derivation has even been defined, which happened quite recently (compared
to the duration of mathematics). There was an attempt to formalize and fix these rules
when formal systems and derivations were first defined, but this attempt failed to change
mathematical practice (while being an interesting object of study by itself).
Now the question arises: why are some rules of reasoning adopted rather than others? This
calls for the second level of our answer. In the chapter “The Uniqueness of Mathematics
as a Social Practice” of his book Azzouni [2006] writes:
What seems odd about mathematics as a social practice is the presence of
substantial conformity on the one hand, and yet, on the other, the absence
of (sometimes brutal) social tools to induce conformity that routinely appear
among us whenever behavior really is socially constrained. Let’s call this “the
benign fixation of mathematical practice”.
and further gives three reasons for this “benign fixation”:
1. “...a capacity to carry out algorithms, and – it’s important to stress this – this is a
species-wide capacity: We can carry out algorithms and teach each other to carry
(out) specific algorithms in the same way” (italics in the original)
2. “Arithmetic and geometry, in particular, have obviously intended domains of appli-
cation. These fixed domains of application to some extent prevent drift in the rules
governing terms of mathematics – in these subjects so applied, anyway – because
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successful application makes us loath to change successfully applied theorems if that
costs us applicability.”
3. “an at least partially “hard-wired” disposition to reason in a particular way”
While we agree with Azzouni that the above facts may indeed be true, we do not share
his opinion that all of them are reasons for conformity in mathematics. The capacity
to carry out algorithms in the same way does not seem to be an important reason for
this conformity, due to the fact that only a small part of the mathematical lore has al-
gorithmic nature. This capacity may well justify the agreement on some arithmetic laws,
like commutativity or associativity of addition, but can be hardly considered a reason
for conformity in some abstract parts of mathematics, like general topology. Likewise,
while invoking applications can possibly “prevent drift” in rules applied to arithmetic or
geometry, no such applications can be conceived for highly abstract domains like, e.g,
the theory of large cardinals, which are abstract concepts used to differentiate between
different sizes of “very large” infinite sets. By contrast, the third reason cited by Azzouni
seems more convincing. It is hard not to observe a “disposition to reason in a particular
way” widely spread among humans. In other words, some basic rules of reasoning formal-
ized in logic,∗ such as modus ponens, or deriving a property of a particular object from
the assertion that all objects have this property, seem to be innate to most human beings.
One might even hypothesize that lack of disposition to use such basic rules during the
development of the species would disadvantage an individual in the competition for sur-
vival, thus causing such dispositions to be “hard-wired” in the brain by the evolutionary
process. Once a strong majority adopts such homogeneous rules, these rules are in turn
reinforced socially. (It is enough to imagine prospects of a mathematics student who re-
fuses to use modus ponens or the principle of mathematical induction claiming that these
principles seem unnatural to him or her.) If the hypothesis of innate uniform rules of
reasoning among humans is true, the homogeneity of these rules could play a similar role
in preserving (general) conformity in mathematics as observation of the external world
plays in experimental sciences.
Here we mean classical logic, since this logic is used in an overwhelming part of mathematics.
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To summarize, while fundamental reasons for agreement in mathematics and in experi-
mental sciences may admittedly be different, the social process through which this agree-
ment is reached is similar: in both cases it is the discussion among experts. Both in
the case of mathematics and of experimental sciences and technological domains, some
members of the community may remain unconvinced, so it is often impossible to reach
unanimity rather than general consensus. Sometimes, virtually all members of the com-
munity agree, but this is true both in mathematics (in the case of well-known, established
theorems) and in physics for instance (the laws of optics or the non-existence of per-
petuum mobile). Controversies have also different sources, depending on the domain. In
mathematics, disagreement comes mostly from different opinions on whether particular
steps of a complex argument are correct, while in experimental sciences we should rather
expect disagreements concerning such issues as the framework in which experiments were
conducted, statistical validity of experimental samples, or data interpretation. Arguably,
in the social sciences and humanities, the situation may be very different, one of the rea-
sons being that terms used in these domains are sometimes ambiguous or ill-defined, and
as a result, even the crux of the controversy may be hard to specify. This issue, however,
is perhaps better left for further discussion.
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